Latest Research on Functionalism: Jan – 2020

Functionalism

Functional theorizing was sociology’s first theoretical perspective, arguing that the analysis of social systems should consider the survival needs or imperatives of the system that a specific subsystem meets. Functionalism emerged with Comte , and was further developed by Spencer and Durkheim , but by the 1920s it had disappeared from sociology. It remained in biology, and within the 1950s was reborn in sociology, primarily under the direction of Talcott Parsons’s work. However, the attitude is inherently flawed by variety of problems, including a conservative bias and a bent to construct illegitimate teleologies and argue tautologically. As a result, it seemed to die again by the top of the 20 th century, only to reemerge in dramatically altered form in new sorts of evolutionary sociology. [1]

Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law

In law of nations , unlike the opposite branches of legal science, positivism remains a determining influence. Positivist philosophy restricts the thing of knowledge domain to matters which will be verified by observation, and thus excludes from its domain all matters of an a priori, metaphysical nature. Positivism accepted the breakdown of the good metaphysical systems of the eighteenth and therefore the refore the early nineteenth centuries and the resulting decadence of metaphysical jurisprudence as a longtime fact. Positivism transplanted schematically the highly refined positivist method of formalist and conceptualist interpretation into the domain of law of nations . The legacy which positivism has left to the science of law of nations consists within the task of comprehending the law of nations of a given time as standing during a dual functional relationship with the social forces of this point . Positivism transplanted schematically the highly refined positivist method of formalist and conceptualist interpretation into the domain of law of nations. [2]

Phenomenal experience and functionalism.

this essay is about consciousness as phenomenal experience / its contention is that regard to consciousness in psychology is demanded, legitimate, and necessary / it’s demanded since consciousness may be a central (if not the central) aspect of mental life / it’s legitimate since there are as reasonable grounds for identifying consciousness as there are for identifying other psychological constructs / it’s necessary since it’s explanatory value, and since there are grounds for positing that it’s causal status

however, the connection of certain aspects of consciousness to the functionalist approach, which currently dominates and unites science , is problematic / those aspects discussed here are phenomenal experience and content / their functionalism are going to be ready to affect the issues posed, or a purely functionalist psychology are going to be inadequate / psychology without consciousness, without phenomenal experience or the private level, could also be biology or cybernetics, but it’s not psychology (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved). [3]

The dappled nature of causes of psychiatric illness: replacing the organic–functional/hardware–software dichotomy with empirically based pluralism

Our tendency to ascertain the planet of psychiatric illness in dichotomous and opposing terms has three major sources: the philosophy of Descartes, the state of neuropathology in late nineteenth century Europe (when disorders were divided into those with and without demonstrable pathology and labeled, respectively, organic and functional), and therefore the influential concept of computer functionalism wherein the pc is viewed as a model for the human mind–brain system (brain=hardware, mind=software). These mutually re-enforcing dichotomies, which have had a pernicious influence on our field, make a transparent prediction about how ‘difference-makers’ (aka causal risk factors) for psychiatric disorders should be distributed in nature. [4]

How is Block’s Central Argument against Functionalism?

Block argued against functionalism. The argument was metaphorized by building a traditional body but with the brain of a homunculus. A review of the metaphorization exposes that the argument is insufficient to avoid the weakness of the functionalist doctrine. [5]

Reference

[1] Turner, J.H., 2017. Functionalism. The Wiley‐Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social Theory, (Web Link)

[2] Morgenthau, H.J., 2017. Positivism, functionalism, and international law. In The Nature of International Law (pp. 159-184). Routledge. (Web Link)

[3] Marcel, A.J., 1988. Phenomenal experience and functionalism. (Web Link)

[4] The dappled nature of causes of psychiatric illness: replacing the organic–functional/hardware–software dichotomy with empirically based pluralism
K S Kendler
Molecular Psychiatry volume 17, (Web Link)

[5] G. Ma, Z. (2018) “How is Block’s Central Argument against Functionalism?”, Asian Research Journal of Arts & Social Sciences, 5(1), (Web Link)

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