State fragility and violent uprisings in Nigeria : The case of Boko Haram
The emergence of the Islamic sect, Boko Haram, and its transformation into a terrorist organisation has dominated recent discourse in the fields of political science and security studies, both within and without the socio-politico enclave known as Nigeria. Much of the discussion has centred on the extra-judicial execution of its founder, Mohammed Yusuf, which purportedly intensified the radicalisation of the group, and whether or not the sect receives operational and/or financial support from foreign terrorist associations. The interest of others has been to forecast the possibility of the internationalisation of the group’s activities. This paper aligns with those whose interest is to identify and proffer ways of resolving factors that predisposed the Nigerian state to the levels of violence perpetrated by Boko Haram, with a view to averting much greater crises in the future. It adopts some historicism in demonstrating that the responsibility for the deepening insecurity in the country resides in the Nigerian state structure, which has often been seen as willing to sacrifice the well-being of the many for the benefit of a few. On the whole, the paper utilises state fragility as the framework of analysis by identifying the incapacity of the state in effective service delivery, which has as a result created a situation of mass unemployment and extreme poverty that has fanned the Boko Haram uprising. It concludes that a sustainable solution to the crisis lies in addressing the root causes of inequality, unemployment and poverty, with which most Nigerians, particularly in the north, subsist. 
A Sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: The Case of Boko Haram
Boko Haram is an Islamic sect turned terrorist group. Despite its ethnic leaning, it is not a liberation front, and it does not advocate a people’s revolution. From an ideological point of view, it is a jihadist movement because it fights for full implementation of strict sharia law which would require a change of political regime and the establishment of an Islamic state. But it does not really follow the Wahhabi model of Al Qaeda or Daesh, unlike AQIM in Northern Mali or Al Shabaab in Somalia. In the region of Greater Borno, which encompasses parts of Nigeria, Chad, Niger, and Cameroon, the sect remains embedded in local dynamics which this article explores through an analysis of the mobilization of its members. 
Religious Extremism in Northern Nigeria Past and Present: Parallels between the Pseudo-Tijanis and Boko Haram
This paper has three main objectives. The first is to contribute to the process, which is being pursued by an increasing number of scholars with ever greater urgency, of mapping Boko Haram. The second is to make the point that, while Boko Haram might be unique, it is not the first Islamic group to spring from or operate in northern Nigeria, to the alarm of either the country’s government or the international community. The third is to highlight a historical paradox: the Tijaniyya’s shift from suspect to ally. To achieve these ambitions, the paper compares Boko Haram with what the British authorities in Nigeria in the 1920s described as the pseudo-Tijanis. More specifically, it points to: their complicated organisational structures; their links to other groups and bodies elsewhere in the Islamic world; and the difficult and delicate positions in which their actions placed the North’s traditional leaders. 
Effect of Boko Haram Insurgency on the Productivity of Local Farmers in Adamawa State, Nigeria
The negative effect of Boko Haram insurgency in the North East Nigeria continues to be a source of worry to all and sundry. The main thrust of this research is to examine the effect of the sect activities on output status of peasant farmers in selected localities in Adamawa state. Three hundred and thirty-three (330) questionnaires were distributed to the target population. Both descriptive and inferential analysis was used in the research. Logit Model was used to determine the productivity of local farmers in the study area. The findings showed that, all the coefficients are statistically significant from 1 to 10% (0.000, 0.034 and 0.087). The major findings showed that: Peasant farmers experience decrease in their productivity, decline in the income of local farmers in the affected areas. Majority of the farmers in the affected areas are women farmers in the affected areas and could no longer access credit facilities. Government could no longer provide farm input subsidy as a result of fear of unknown. The researchers among others recommended that; there is an urgent need for Government and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) to step into the issue of farm input subsidy and increase the provision of credit facilities, special agricultural program and policies are to be initiated in order to resuscitate agricultural potentials of the affected zone. 
Corruption and the Challenge of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: A Case of the Nigerian Armed Forces
The study examines the extent to which corruption in the Nigerian armed forces has been able to undermine the fight against Boko Haram terrorism in Nigeria. The study relied on the qualitative content analysis of secondary sources of data, and the theory of structural functionalism was adopted as the tool of analysis for the study. A thrust through the evolution and acts of terror of Boko Haram in Nigeria revealed that poverty, inequality, and corruption precipitated the rise of the sect and that Abubakar Shekau adopted a more extremist doctrine and approach for the sect after the death of Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. Since then it has been mayhem for Nigeria; the sect accounting for over 20,000 deaths and the displacement of over 1.3 million people. The paper argued that corruption has eaten deep into the Nigerian armed forces and has undermined the fight against Boko Haram through the theft of defence appropriations, the purchase of substandard weaponry, the creation of fake defence contracts, and the unavailability of logistical supports for and desertion of soldiers on the frontline. The paper, therefore, recommends the adoption of genuine political will in the anti-graft war and the strengthening of existing anti-graft agencies, the diligent monitoring of defence contracts and the performance of offsets arrangements in defence contracts, the introduction of socio-economic empowerment programs to create employment for unemployed youths particularly in the Northeast, and the prompt provision of adequate military logistics and sophisticated arms and ammunition for the soldiers on the frontline. 
 Tonwe, D.A. and Eke, S.J., 2013. State fragility and violent uprisings in Nigeria: The case of Boko Haram. African Security Review, 22(4), pp.232-243.
 Pérouse de Montclos, M.A., 2016. A sectarian Jihad in Nigeria: the case of Boko Haram. Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27(5), pp.878-895.
 Hill, J.N., 2013. Religious extremism in Northern Nigeria past and present: Parallels between the pseudo-Tijanis and Boko Haram. The Round Table, 102(3), pp.235-244.
 Esthon Sidney, A., Zummo Hayatudeen, S. and Pindar Kwajafa, A. (2017) “Effect of Boko Haram Insurgency on the Productivity of Local Farmers in Adamawa State, Nigeria”, Asian Journal of Economics, Business and Accounting, 5(3), pp. 1-7. doi: 10.9734/AJEBA/2017/36177.
 Offiong Duke, O., David Agbaji, D. and Bassey, O. (2017) “Corruption and the Challenge of Boko Haram Terrorism in Nigeria: A Case of the Nigerian Armed Forces”, Asian Research Journal of Arts & Social Sciences, 4(2), pp. 1-20. doi: 10.9734/ARJASS/2017/34025.